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1. European-American relations are currently a topic of extended, and sometimes 
impassioned discussion in our countries. 
This, itself, is positive. It occurs,and not~ chance, at a delicate time 
·in international relations. Because of the East-West crisis, it is perhaps the 
most delicate time in the postwar period. 
The attention that the Atlantic Alliance public is giving to European-American 
relations is ~dicative of how these relations are perceived - especially in times 
of tension - as essential and basic for western securit~ for stability in East-
West relations, and for world peace. 
It cannot be said, however, that objectivity and sound judgment are always 
used, on both sides of the Atlantic, in analyzing the different aspects of these 
relations. This is especially true when we deal with the Alliance's defense stra-
tegy and the divisions of responsibility within the Alliance, ar.mS reduction, and 
allied response to Soviet attempts at destabilization in the Third World and to 
threats in Eastern Europe. 
2. Let me give you my first thoughts on this. 
Today we often hear about the weakness of Western-democracies and their in-
ability to react adequately to the internal and external evils afflicting them. 
You will all recall, perhaps, the Trilateral_ Commission report on the "Crisis 
of Democracy." In the report, reference was made to the fragility of.Western, and 
especially European societies. And it concluded that the times of democracy may be 
reaching their end. 
But, on the other hand, it has also been observed that the crisis of democracy 
is as old as democracy itself. This is a valid observation because the dialectic 
within democracy helps make those societies, such as ours, aspire to the principles 
of freedom and pluralism. 
Remaining differences between Americans and Europeans are not the result of a 
lack of good will on either's part. It is, rather, something inherent to our status 
as free men belonging to the same culture and civilization. 
~erefore, these differences do not affect the essence of our common vision, 
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but are a part of the process of exchanging ideas - which remains a positive one. 
It cannot be said that the diversities between Americans and Europeans are 
always accurately perceived, or that differences between European countries are well 
perceived on this side of the Atlantic. And the very effort to reach a common posi-
tion - that is, between America and the various European countries - is often viewed 
as a futile waste. of time. 
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But this is not so. Each of our countries has its own traditions, needs ~d 
aspirations, making it an individual protagonist on the international stage. And 
the cooperati~n which unites us develops and enriches through constant contributions 
·. we make to each other as equals. 
This is a fundamental point which is often misunderstood and boldy interpreted. 
This is where the roots of Western democracy's superiority-over the gloomy totali-
tarianism surrounding it may be found - in its inherent pluralism. 
3. In my opinion, European-American relations may be placed in this context. 
These relations have been influenced conclusively, I believe by a change in 
the international picture which took place during this time, the end of the Seventies 
and the beginning of the Eighties. It has become obvious that Moscow no longer in-
tends to respect the general rules of conduct between the two superpowers which 
were agreed to by Nixon and Breznev in 1972. 
A final :~low to progressively worsening East-West relations came to a 
head with the military invasion of Afghanistan. This cast the shadow of Soviet 
threat over the Gulf, and therefore, over the oil supplies vital to Western economies. 
The Soviet invasion occured in a part of the world shaken by the Iranian Revo-
lution. The most disturbing episode of the revolution, although it ended positively, 
was the taking of hostages from the American embassy in Teheran. 
I spoke of Afghanistan as something coming to a head. But Soviet intervention 
in that country must be linked to infiltration in Angola, the horn of Africa and 
South Yemen. These events have given Moscow's for.eign policy the alanning image of 
open interventionism, although conveniently masked by the role assigend to the Cubans. 
Not only are there threats against Third World countries but also those against 
the Atlantic Alliance countries, 'and particularly Europe, in the form of massive 
reinforcement of the Soviet Union's military potential. This reinforcement has be-
come a source of tension, as an acceptable level of parity or equivalence has been 
exceeded, which may irreparably alter the balance of forces. 
4. Finally, repression in Poland has greatly hindered the process, begun in 
Helsinki, of finding new ways to foster and develop fruitful and open relations 
between nations, peoples and individuals. It has, therefore, seriously compromised 
the goal of imProving the very quality of East-West cooperation. 
These dramatic events have altered, if not in fact upset, the rules of the 
game to which we were accustomed in the Seventies and to which we had strictly ad-
hered in our relations with the East. It must be frankly admitted that, faced with 
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this new, radical Soviet attitude, we Americans and Europeans have been taken by 
surprise. 
Thus the problem arises: how we will adapt to the new arid changing situation 
of the Eighties; therefore, how we will transla~e the very comparable views of the 
Western countries on the most important international events into a more convincing 
and effective line of action. 
5. To this end, it will be qseful to ex~ne, above all,if and to what degree the 
different opinions felt by the general public on both sides of the Atlantic can meet 
on the practical level. 
It will also be necessary to examine the efforts made by the American and 
European Governments to develop, within the Atlantic Alliance or through direct 
contact~ a common ground, a common strategy on relations with the Soviet lmion· 
Given this, we will have to see if it is possible to fill the gaps and improve the 
tools currently used in European-American discussions and actions. 
This will mean laying great stress on three areas which, in my opinion, will 
test Western cooperation: East-West relations, political and economic aid to Third 
World countries, and the crisis of the world economic system. 
6. A profound malaise is often reflected by public opinion about European-American 
relations. In the United States there seems to be a tendency urging on immediate 
test of strength with the Soviet Union. This seems to be based on the hope that 
contradictions within the Communist world would increase and the conviction that 
only by increasing tension will the West decide to take the necessary measures to 
matntaining a balance of power. 
On the other hand, there seem to be forces in Europe which urge pure and simple 
cooperation with the Soviet block - this, again, for different motives: either in 
the conviction that only in a climate of detente and cooperation can liberal tenden-
cies and forces develop in the East, or in the fear that a renewed cold war and an 
arms race will risk conflict involving, first of all, the old continent. In addition, 
the immoderate growth of Soviet military power and the loss of strategic superiority, 
which the. United States enjoyed until the mid-Seventies, make the European public 
all the more concerned. 
However, to American observers, Europe seems tempted by dangerous neutralism 
and pacifism is threatening the very foundations of the joint defense policy. 
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In the nuclear area again looking at the opinions of the general public, there is 
today a difference of perception and awareness between America and Europe which 
would be_dangerous to ignore, especially in an organization like ours, founded on 
consensus. 
Due to its specific geographical position, Europe, the old continent, appears 
more aware of the risks of a nuclear conflict and, therefore, some react with greater 
alann to the theory that the balance, which up to now has avoided conflict, can no 
longer guarantee peace. 
As for the economic and trade relations with the Eastern ·countries, there seems to 
be concern in the United States over the negative consequences which would result if 
trade were to increase between the Soviet Union and Europe, Particular attention is 
place on the European cmmtries 1 "vulnerability" should the Soviet Union shut off the 
supply of natural gas. 
In Europe, on the aher hand, it is felt that economic ties with the West could 
moderate M:isc<M' s behavior, .And the possibility of Moscow's using natural gas as a 
weapon is regarded with ruch skepticism. It is felt that the pyschological impact of 
cutting off natural gas suppl~es would be extremely negative. In any case, Europe 
would be able to c001pensate for any interruption with gas ·supplies from other areas -
the North Sea and North Africa, for exaJI'q)le -. or from al temati ve sources of energy. 
7. Economic and trade relations between America and Europe also call for some 
clarifications. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, major interests are at stake. They have been . 
threatened by inflation, costs of raw materials and the rigidity of production systems. 
In both Europe and America there is strong apprehension about the possibilities of 
increased protectionist pressures, increased debates, and more restrictions leading 
in tum to retaliation and various types of cotm.tenneasures. Both Europe and America 
stress their different economic approaches, especially towards agriculture. Another 
e~le of friction is the Common Market countries' steel exports to the United States. 
In the current delicate reorganizational phase of the iran and steel industry in all tl 
industrialized countries, these exports are considered to be against the interests of 
American business, which is urging the government to adopt retaliatory measures. 
On the macroecanomis level, the Federal Reserve's high interest rate policy is 
causing anxiety in Europe. This is a policy which, although it certainly answers the 
need for restraining domestic American demand, is having a direct effect on the 
interest rates of the European countries and aggravating their financial situations. 
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The American and European Governments have reacted to these diverging attitudes -
which are increasingly affecting public opinion - by making an effort to develop, 
and I would say with positive results, a common stvategy toward the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union, in fact, represents the biggest danger to the tmi ty of the Atlantic 
Allicance, while on other problems, in particular the Nliddle East, the viewpoints 
of Americans and Europeans have become increasingly similar, possibly to an extent 
that, as we shall see, they are nearer th~ they have ever been before. 
Within this effort at rapprochement in all fields, I must stress the positive 
action of the State Departrnent and, in particular, of Alexander Haig, whose openness 
and commitment to peace I have been able to appreciate - both in frequent personal 
contacts and in multilateral meetings. 
9. I now come to the Polish question, on which I would like to dwell. It is 
currently a central issue; not only because it is at the center of Europe and therefore 
affects us Europeans, but because at this manent, at least, all East-West relations 
hinge on developments in the Polish issue. It is a touchstone of all the 
possibilities for furthering East-West relations. Hence, the interest and also the 
delicacy of discussions and the difficulty. in finding common approaches. 
Two acts have defined these approaches: the January 4 resolution adopted by the 
European cotmtries and the statement issued by the Alliance cotmtries at the 
January 11 Special Nlinisterial Meeting. 
Politically the European resultian was harsh. It called a spade a spade; 
it called repression "repression,'~ and_ defined it as being contrary to the Helsinki 
Act. 
This reference to the Helsinki Act is important. It is important because the 
signatories of the Helsinki Act are mainly. in Europe, and because it is incumbent 
an the European cOtmtries, in particular, to respect this code, which governs , or 
should govern, the behavfuor of the signatory countries, although this is not always 
the case. 
On January 11, fifteen of us tmanirnously recognized that, although repression 
originated internally, the political motivation also came from outside, from the 
Soviet Union, which had exerted strong pressure on Polish authorities. 
I would really like to stress the similarity of views between the Western Allies. 
I am convinced that there could have been and there was only one decision as to the 
advisability of openly and clearly stating that the Soviet Union is directly 
implicated in the Polish problem. 
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10. Therefore, we have also discussed, and at length, the measures to adopt regard-
ing both Poland and the Soviet Union. 
With reference to Poland, it seemed to me that certain commentators made a dis-
tinction between the measures adopted by the United States and those adopted by 
certain European countries. 
I must immediately say that this was not the point. 
On January 4, in fact, the European countries decided to suspend the commercial 
credits extended to Poland, but to continue, although with certain guarantees, the 
supplying.food aid. 
On this point there was, therefore, no difference at all between the United 
States and the European countries. 
There were some differences, on the measures to adopt towards the Soviet Union~ 
From the round of consul tat ions carried o~t in the first days of January in 
the European capitals by Undersecretary Eagleburger, the need emerged to examine the 
problem in greater depth and, therefore, give each of our respective Governments 
the chance to carefully consider what to do next. 
The American Administration considered that it had to take certain measures 
before the Special Session of NATO. I point out that, of these measures, some 
have an' influence on European economies: for example, the gas pipeline; since 
European supplies to the Soviet Union include American know-how, some limitations 
have become necessary, due to these well-known American measures. 
At that time, there was the political problem of what the Europeans should 
have done: that_is, if they should have adopted the same measures as the Americans, 
or if they should have consulted with the United States and among each other to see 
what each of them could do considering existing legislation, political position 
interests of each country. 
This was the approach in the NATO Comnnmique of January 11. It, in fact, lists 
a suitably balanced series of measures to be discussed • in order to reach a common 
decision and, therefore, provides that there be·immediate consultations by the·experts 
On these topics there are certainly some variations in Western positions. 
I would judge the various stages of reaction to the events in Poland as positive. 
There had to be some discussion, it is true, but, in fact, the Allies succeeded in 
expressing a unity of intention for common political decisions, for decisions which 
are economically possible, and at any rate, none of the Allies took steps which· 
would have hampered the measures taken or evisaged by their partners. 
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11. MOre generally, supposing real stability in East-West relations, our commitment 
continues to be that of maintaining the balance of forces in all spheres, especially 
militarily. 
Maintaining the balance of power means for us in Europe, as well, accepting 
responsibilities and carrying out duties. And this is why we Italians, together 
with the Germans and the British, decided to install modern long-rage theatre 
weapons on our territory, and we have also agreed to suitably increase defense ex-
penditures in real terms. 
These decisions are intended to insure the balance of forces and thus them-
selves represent a basic component of East-West stability. 
The only way we can - with any chances of success - begin talks on arms control 
and reduction is'with a balance of forces. 
On arms control consultation5 between the two sides of the-Atlantic have been 
particularly active lately. They have led, as you know, to the formulation of a 
joint position which has been expressed by the United States in negotiations currently 
taking place in Geneva with the Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear weapons. 
The so-called Zero Option is a result of these consultations. 
This offer must be seen in the context of the ttnouble Decision" adopted by NATO 
in December of 1979 - a decision which reflects the necessity that nuclear arms talks 
must not weaken the Alliance's defense capabilities, which would be fatal for all 
Americans and Europeans . 
12. The Western countries must look at the need to equip themselves with ways to 
contain Soviet expansion, appropriate to the broader'context of the eighties. This 
context involves, above all, a rethinking of the concept of security itself. Secu-
rity is not only dissuasion: it also means finding .the origins of the threat·.; it is 
prevention; it is reduction of conflict potential everywhere. 
I believe, however, that in terms of the Third World countries we cannot reason 
in terms of containment alone. We must grasp the true sense of the existing tensions 
and local conflicts, which are outsidcthe East~ West relationship. We must first 
realize that different solutions exist.from continent to continent, that the Western 
countries, and particularly the European ones, have historic responsibilities to 
the Third World and that, therefore, they must actively cooperate with each other 
to encourage stability within it. 
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: And from these responsibilities comes the specific task of all of us! To 
ensure that our actions leading to peace also strenghen democracy in Third World 
countries or encourage democracy where it does not exist means that our actions 
must be coordinated and timely. In the case of El Salvador, the Italian Government, 
along with the other European governments, has maintained and will continue to 
maintain that conditions of armed conflict must be kept from spreading, and tOgether we 
have supported a solution based on a dialogue between the political forces.of that 
civil war-torn country. 
The action of the Western countries -·the United States and Europe - must move 
toward defending htmlan rights in that troubled country and toward creating conditions 
for favorable social and economic development. 
Development aid naturally represents an important aspect of Western strategy directed 
at promoting.not only political stability but also the growth and well-being of the 
emerging nations. Government action is essential, but the role of private investment 
cannot be replaced as a way of transferring technologies. 
It is even more important to promote a progressive integration of these countries 
in international trade, which in turn, presupposes the willingness of the more 
advanced nations to make appropriate adjustments to their economies~ 
15. In the context of Western contributions to overcoming local tens~ons, the ~1iddle 
East problem deserves special mention because American and European positions have 
become increasingly harmonized in this area. I am referring to the participation of 
four European countries, including Italy, in the '~ltinational Force of Sinai 
Observers." 
European participation in the "force" must be viewed in the wide context of the 
contribution which the old ccntinent is attempting to make in order to bring peace to 
such a tormented region, and this is why Europe could not remain uninvolved in an 
event which has resulted in, for the first time in fifteen years, the Israeli with-
drawal from occupied territories and has given a solid basis to prospects for peace be-
between two countries which until recently were enemies. 
For this reason Italy, on the invitation of the parties involved, including the 
United States, has seen it necessary to make a particular effort in demonstrating the 
European presence. This presence - which is based on the implementation of Resolution 
242 - will strengthen the prospects for peace in the region, laying the groundwork 
for progress in future negotiations. 
In this regard, and based on the statement of the Ten in Venice and also in lfi.ght of 
my recent direct contacts, I believe I must stress the importance which the 
Arab world places on the solution of the Palestinian problem - which is a central 
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problem a positive solution to which is considered indispensible even by the moderate 
Arab cotmtries. 
We consider, for our part, that the real prospect of an overall solution to 
the Middle-East problem is linked to the direct involvement of the Palestinians-
in the peace efforts. We feel that this could come about only through mutual accep-
tance, by both Israelis and Palestinians of the essential rights of the other, even 
if only de facto and conditional at first. 
14. I would now like to speak briefly of the present international economic situa-
tion and, in particular, of the responsibilities which America and Europe share in 
overcoming the economic crisis. 
A careful evaluation of the way in which these relationships are developing 
leads to the conclusion that, at least up to now, there has not been satisfactory 
coordination between these two great economic areas. Coordination has been lacking, 
despite the efforts and the results of the summits of the seven industrialized 
countries, which have been held since 1975, from Rambouillet to Ottawa. There 
has not been sufficient harmonization of economic polici'es which is a concrete ex-
pression of reciprocal solidarity, which is especially necessary in periods of crisis. 
It is precisely this crisis which has demonstrated the need for a global stra-
tegy on the part of the industrialized countries concerning economic growth, employ-
ment and inflation, monetary policy, energy and trade. 
Th~ manner in which cooperation is achieved between interdependent economic 
systmes to over coming present difficulties. 
I believe that it is necessary, meanwhile, to pinpoint some short-term measures 
which will act to harmonize of the internal demand policies of the great economic 
areas of the West. 
The most serious problem which these areas must tackle is seen in the projection 
·that at the end of this year the surplus of the current part of the balance of pay-
ments of the oil-producing nations will be 80 billion dollars. There will thus be 
a corresponding deficit of the same amount which will mainly affect the balance of 
payments of the industrialized countrie·s. 
This premise means that the industrialized countries of the West must re-examine 
the goals of their respective economic policies based on the shortfall of the current 
balance which each is prepared to accept. It is here that we must meet, in order 
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to then adapt national policies of internal demand, interest rates, exchange rates 
and therefore foreign trade to the projected goal. 
But coordinating short term economic policies is not enough. The countries in 
the great industrialized economic areas must also be more aware of the developments 
in the world economy to know how to draw the appropriate conclusions from the 
gradual appearance of newly industrialized countries on the international scene. 
Discussions will therefore be necessary on structural policies in order to 
identify the sectors in which, on the basis of a better international division 
of labor, they can concentrate respec~ive efforts on industrial adjustment. 
This is why I said a little earlier that we need sufficient cooperation 
between the industrialized countries, particularly between the United States and 
the European Community, but also with Canada and Japan. Everyone, in fact, must 
keep well in mind the danger of deterioration, which can also arise from a limited 
and partial solidarity. 
15. ·We must examine what adjustments· the international situation calls for and how 
to ensure that this solidarity is full and beneficial. 
In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the backdrop against which we 
are moving. The threats to our security and, more generally, to peace are many and 
varied- more so than in the past, even the recent past, and they are more dangerous, 
and I would aaa, subtler. 
The acceptance itself of the term "solidarity", as understood in the North 
Atlantic Treaty, that is, as a commdtment to the allies to maintain and increase their 
individual and collective capability to resist an armed attack, appears insufficient 
and, at any rate, inadequate in regard to a more complex reality. 
The crises of these past years, which have given rise, as we have seen, to a 
process of consultation and discussion between the Atlantic allies, certainly cannot 
be attributed to predetermined concepts. Nevertheless,_it is this process, imposed 
by circumstances, under the pressure of events, perhaps more than by the will of 
their protagonists, which has led to a new solidarity: a solidarity written in fact, 
more than in solemn declarations and agreements. 
And with this solidarity, there is a corresponding assumption on the part of 
the United States and its European allies of common duties and responsibilities, 
arising from the awareness that, in view of the seriousness and the complexity of 
the situations facing us, we must give proof of unity and effectiveness. 
The problem of participation in defining and managing a joint strategy must be 
placed in this context - a strategy which also reflects, in the spirit of "equal 
Atlantic partnership," the fundamental features of our democratic, pluralistic 
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societies, while respecting differences,·-and mediating between different, and 
often opposing requirements. 
But a common strategy, designed to safeguard as much as possible the 
fundamental interests of the West, cannot result from an operation which may be 
tenninated.at any time. 
The very fact that it must have an effect on a changing reality proves the 
need for continual adjustments wise and appropriate corrections in order to 
respond promptly in the most suitably tactical manner to the new circumstances 
which are continually arising. 
16. How likely is it, then, at such a complex and critical stage of international 
politics, that the policies of the Atlantic Alliance Governments will converge, 
for any length of time? 
We are all of us convinced of the necessity for this convergence. 
We are as President Reagan said, a strong and prosperous America, at peace with 
itself and with others. There is the need - I add - of a Europe, able to assume 
high-level political responsibilities in world affairs. 
It has been said here in the United States that Europe's inability to emerge 
on the international scene has been "the principal and continual delusion of American 
postwar politics". 
There is, in this evaluation, another aspect, which I consider positive: the 
awaren~ss that America, facing the gravity of the international situation, can only 
gain if it can count on a strong and responsible partner with whom to share its 
basic objectives. 
Today Europe is advancing, albeit laboriously, along the road to political, as 
well as economic integration. 
The European community has become a model for the Third World countries, as 
well as a guide for other countries in Western Europe. 
The system of European political cooperation has improved with time a~ well aswith 
the thrust of international events. So, today, the formulation of common positions 
and the community-wide irnplementation,.through the rotating chairmanship of decisions 
adopted by the Ten tend to reduce the weight of national choices, and thus announce 
a European foreign policy. 
But today this process designed to lead to European union is still imcomplete. 
There remains a wide margin for the action of the individual governments eventhough 
they are tending to become part and parc~l of the plans for European polit1cal cooper-
ation. Today, European countries have been able to assume their responsibilities 
under the terms of the Strategic-Military Alliance and assert the European presence 
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throughout the world. I recall, in particular, the decisions to modernize the 
theatre nuclear weapons and to participate in the multinational force in the Sinai. 
17. It has been said that, faced with our present difficulties, we need a spark of 
"heal thy diligence" which lets us go straight to the heart of matters. 
I believe that we should bear this maxim in mind when we speak of Atlantic 
consultation, about whi~ so much has already been said.and written, although often 
superficially. 
In a situation such as this, with a crisis in the Soviet system, where weakness 
contributes to a potential danger, with instability in developing societies, with 
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the structural economic difficulties in the industrially advanced societies and 
with a Europe in the throes of difficult unification, the Allies must find a way to 
continually evaluate any situation which may arise. 
It seems also appropriate to ask, when evaluating existing communication channels, 
whether they are world wide both in topic and geographical scope. 
Also, I would say there are numerous fonnal and substantial limits to NATO dis-
cussions. They do not presently cover the entire range of political relations which 
have developed among the members of the Alliance. 
Political consultation is a part of the summits of the seven industrialized 
countries. These summits, initially designed ibrdealing with world economic problems 
in the.last two years, have begun to tackle - due largely to Italian requests - poli-
tical topics as well. But since the summits only take place once a year, "Adjust-
ments" - absolutely necessary to draw up and direct a connnon Atlantic course - ca.nilot 
be made. 
In the field of economic relationships, the periodic consultations between 
the United States and the European cornmunitycornrnission assume particular importance 
in the topics they cover within the sphere of action of t~e latter. And we should 
·not tmderestl.m.ate the different· and ~ider role-played by the Organization-for·Economic 
COoperation and Development. 
Along.with these multilateral channels there are bilateral contacts, which re-
main valid in the current phase of European integration. 
One can easily see that the way in which the Atlantic consultations are presently 
carried out does not necessarily lead to that convergence of allied positions which 




We must, therefore, urgently remedy these deficiencies. It is essential that 
the political will of America and Europe ( that is the European community in its 
political and economic forms) must be strongly reaffirmed so that we act together 
in order to pursue the common ideals of security, freedom and peace. My preference 
is for a formal instrument. 
I would propose that this common pqlitical will be solemnly re-affirmed in a 
text, for example,a·Euro-American Friendship Pact strengtl1ening democracy and cooper-
ation which should, naturally, cover the political aspects of East-West relations, 
actions to be taken in favour of the Third World and the coordination of our economic 
policies. 
This pact, in my opinion, hsould provide for periodic meetings between foreign 
ministers to coordinate their respective views, particularly in times of crisis. 
Without in any way encroaching on the a~thority of either NATO or the summits 
of the industrialized countries, this would provide continuity in the discussions 
and contacts that are necessary to ensure prompt implementation of summit directives. 
Achieving this new framework for European-American relations would - I am certain -
make these relations more harmoniously and would be in the interests of peace. 
The European community countries recognize their share of international respon-
sibilities, and the need to actively consult with a strong and committed America so 
that the next generations may enjoy freedom in a democratic future. 
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